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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Have you ever watched a really great scary movie? A tingle runs 
down your spine and you feel your muscles tense up as you watch the 
monster slowly close in on the film’s protagonists. You can feel a sense 
of dread building up within you; try as they might, the camp 
counselors, the newly-moved family, the babysitting high schooler, are 
all helpless. Sure, maybe they’ve made some dumbfounding mistakes 
(“Don’t run up the stairs!”), but do they deserve the fate they’re sure 
to meet? 
In many ways, modern Hollywood feels like a scary movie. Long 
gone are the days where the major film studios used anticompetitive 
tactics to bend the rest of the industry to their will. That era was 
brought to an end via the Paramount Decrees, a series of consent 
decrees and court opinions in the 1940s and 1950s which used antitrust 
law to break up the studios’ control and allowed other groups to gain 
a foothold in the industry.1 Instead, the studios are playing the roles of 
horror-movie victims, desperately trying to escape the clutches of the 
Silicon Valley boogeyman. Not only are streaming services like 
Netflix and Amazon providing consumers with a cheaper, more 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2020, The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz 
College of Law. 
1 “The Department filed an antitrust lawsuit alleging that eight major motion 
picture companies had conspired to control the motion picture industry through 
their ownership of film distribution and exhibition. The eight original defendants 
were Paramount Pictures, Inc., Twentieth Century-Fox Corporation, Loew’s 
Incorporated (now Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”)), Radio-Keith-Orpheum 
(dissolved in 1959), Warner Brothers Pictures, Columbia Pictures Corporation, 
Universal Corporation, and United Artists Corporation. After a trial, the district 
court found that the defendants had engaged in a wide-spread conspiracy to 
illegally fix motion picture prices and monopolize both the film distribution and 
movie theatre markets. On appeal, the Supreme Court sustained those findings. 
See United States v. Paramount, 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Subsequently, each of the 
defendants entered into a consent decree with the Department (collectively, “the 
Paramount Decrees”).” THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE 
PARAMOUNT DECREES (2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/paramount-decree-
review [https://perma.cc/4NPF-59PM]. 
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accessible way to watch movies at home, but they are also creeping 
closer and closer to a territory that has been the almost-exclusive 
domain of Hollywood since the dawn of film: the box office. Many 
believe that the tech companies entering the industry, like scary movie 
monsters, are unstoppable. No matter how studios tinker with their 
business model, they are supposedly helpless against their newfound 
competitors. 
In light of this new competition, the Department of Justice 
announced that it will be reviewing the seventy-year-old Paramount 
Decrees (“the Decrees”) to determine if their constraints are still 
necessary for modern Hollywood.2 Concerned with potentially 
outdated regulations, the Department of Justice seeks to determine 
whether the Decrees are still effective in their current form, if they 
should be modified to reflect the times, or if the Decrees should be 
removed in their entirety.3 
This paper explores the potential effects of removing the 
Paramount Decrees. The first section provides a history of the Studio 
System that necessitated antitrust intervention last century. The next 
section will detail changes in Hollywood after the Paramount Decrees 
took effect. The third section explores the consequences that would 
come with removing the Decrees, first by covering arguments in favor 
of removal, and then explaining opposing arguments. Finally, the last 
section will argue that changes to the antitrust environment are not 
even needed and that there is some indication that Hollywood is 
adequately adapting to its new tech competitors.  
Would removing the Decrees be good for the industry? At first 
glance, it is easy to say “yes.” Removing the Decrees would give 
studios more freedom in competing with Netflix and Amazon. Without 
the Decrees, studios may regain enough control over the industry to 
stay profitable and fend off their new competitors from Silicon Valley. 
 
2 THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OPENS REVIEW OF PARAMOUNT CONSENT DECREES 
(2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-opens-review-
paramount-consent-decrees [https://perma.cc/R75Q-3E8A]; THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 1; E.g., Ryan Faughnder, Justice Department 
to Review Decades-Old Rules for Movie Studios, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 2, 
2018, 4:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-doj-
paramount-decrees-20180802-story.html [https://perma.cc/6BKT-6AE6]; Eriq 
Gardner, Justice Dept. Reviewing Movie Licensing Restrictions on the Books for 
Decades, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Aug. 02, 2018, 1:12 PM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/justice-dept-reviewing-movie-
licensing-restrictions-books-decades-1131827 [https://perma.cc/2QMY-X44A].  
3See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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However, a closer look at the industry reveals several concerns. 
Removing the Decrees would negatively impact other players in the 
industry, including theater chains and independent producers. 
Removal of the Decrees could also antagonize consumers by way of 
higher prices, potentially driving viewers away from the silver screen 
and to the small screen.  
Removing the Decrees could actually have the opposite of the 
intended effect, providing Netflix and Amazon a path to replace the 
studios as leaders of the industry. The same control the studios seek to 
gain from removing the Decrees could be just as easily taken 
advantage of by Amazon and Netflix. Thus, removing the Decrees 
could be a “don’t run up the stairs!” decision, serving to only speed up 
Silicon Valley’s takeover of the industry (the very thing that removal 
would be intending to prevent).  
Every scary movie has its survivors: the would-be victims who 
refuse to go down. And while Netflix and Amazon might instill fear in 
the hearts of Hollywood’s power brokers, the necessity for antitrust 
deregulation has been overstated. Studios are beginning to adapt their 
business model to their new competitors, in some cases even using tech 
companies for their benefit. Despite well-founded concerns about the 
future of the industry, studios are still surviving. 
 
II. THE STUDIO SYSTEM AND THE NEED FOR ANTITRUST 
 
The Studio System, existing prior to 1948, was a model of 
operation in Hollywood that resulted in unprecedented studio control. 
Prior to the Paramount Decrees, the eight major studios (at the time, 
Paramount, Loew’s, RKO, Warner Bros., Twentieth Century-Fox, 
Columbia, Universal, and United Artists)4 were vertically integrated 
almost completely, controlling all three phases of the film industry 
(production, distribution, and exhibition).5 Studios produced films in-
house with factory-like efficiency.6 Many studios had the capacity to 
produce movies entirely on their backlots.7 Studios maximized their 
capabilities by working around the clock to churn out these in-house 
movies: a feature film could be shot in less than a month, and B films 
 
4 THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 1. 
5 Micah Long, Should the Studios Be Broken Up?: How Hollywood Skirts Anti-
Trust Law, 2017 LIBERTY LAW. 18, 19 (2017). 
6 EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, THE BIG PICTURE: MONEY AND POWER IN HOLLYWOOD 7-
8 (2005). 
7 Id. 
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could be completed in a single week.8 Major studios could shoot up to 
six films at a time.9 
This level of efficiency was possible because practically the entire 
industry was under the thumb of the major studios. In 1939, “about six 
producers...pass on about 90 percent of the script and edit about 90 
percent of the pictures.”10 The major studios controlled theater chains, 
either by owning them directly or controlling them via block 
booking.11 Block booking was the practice of licensing movies to 
theaters in groups of films called “blocks”12 (usually ten films per 
block).13 A theater would have to choose between licensing and 
showing all of the films in the block or none at all.14 Thus, studios 
could force theaters to show lesser-quality films as a requirement for 
licensing more popular films.15 
Along with theater chains, studios also controlled the big-name 
actors and actresses of the day.16 Movie stars were signed to exclusive 
contracts, often at a minimal cost, to a given studio.17 Actors and 
actresses were contractually required to star in every film and 
participate in every bit of publicity assigned to them.18 Rather than bid 
against each other for stars, the studios would “rent” their actors to 
each other, limiting competition for acting talent and thus keeping 
compensation for actors low.19 
 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 7. 
11 Id. at 6; Barak Y. Orbach, Antitrust and Pricing in the Motion Picture Industry, 
21 YALE J. ON REG. 317, 338 (2004); Barak Y. Orbach & Liran Einav, Uniform 
Prices for Differentiated Goods: The Case of the Movie-Theater Industry, 27 
INTERNATIONAL REV. OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 129, 139 (2007); Harrison J. 
Reynolds, Introducing Price Competition at the Box Office, 20 UCLA ENTM’T L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2013). 
12 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
13 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 6. 
14 Supra notes 9-11; 1. “Block-booking was often combined with blind-selling, a 
practice whereby a distributor licenses a feature before the exhibitor has an 
opportunity to view it.” Orbach, supra note 11, at 338.  
15 Supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
16 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 7-9. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. Studios began loaning stars to each other to uphold their agreement not to lure 
away each other’s stars. The usual arrangement “was that the borrowing studio paid 
the loaning studio the star’s contractual wages plus a garnish of 10%.” Id. at 95. “In 
theory, these loan-outs were also available to independent producers, but a 
Department of Justice analysis of loan-outs found that over 90 percent of them 
were to other major studios. By making it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, 
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The studios’ schemes weren’t just about reducing costs: the 
practices were often aimed at eliminating competition as well. 
Censorship codes were often used to prevent foreign and independent 
producers from competing with them at the box office.20 Thanks to 
Depression-era regulations (and a cozy relationship with the FDR 
administration)21, the studios incorporated their “Code of Fair 
Competition” (often referred to as the “Hays Code”) into federal law.22 
This Code was used to set up block booking, clearances, and minimum 
pricing schemes.23 Any theater who refused to follow these practices 
could be punished since the Code carried the weight of federal law.24 
In 1945, the studios also set up the Motion Picture Export 
Association (MPEA) for overseas markets.25 The MPEA allocated 
profits to member studios based on a pre-determined formula.26 Profits 
were determined by each member’s share of the domestic box office, 
rather than the amount of overseas profits a studio was actually 
responsible for.27 
The control the major studios enjoyed meant that they could make 
movies cheaply while insulating their profits from competition. As a 
result, almost all of the major studios’ movies were profitable.28 The 
average production cost in 1947 was $732,000, with the average 
revenue being $1.6 million.29 The most successful movies could net as 
much as $5 million in profits.30  
 
for independent and foreign producers to obtain stars, the moguls reinforced their 
grip” on the industry. Id. 
20 Id. at 93-95. 
21 Many studio executives worked closely with the Roosevelt administration to 
promote the President’s initiatives, to the point where Roosevelt’s political 
opponents accused Hollywood of propagandizing. Larry Getlen, How Hollywood 
became the ‘Sixth Estate’ of Government, NEW YORK POST (Nov. 23, 2014, 4:30 
AM), https://nypost.com/2014/11/23/how-hollywood-became-the-sixth-estate-of-
government/ [https://perma.cc/EA9M-ZW4U] (reviewing KATHRYN CRAMER 
BROWNELL, SHOWBIZ POLITICS: HOLLYWOOD IN AMERICAN POLITICAL LIFE 
(2014)) 
22 J. Douglas Gomery, Hollywood, the National Recovery Administration, and the 
Question of Monopoly Power, 31 NO. 2 J. OF THE UNIV. FILM ASSOC., 47, 49-50 
(1979).  
23 EPSTEIN, supra note 6 at 93-95; . “The vast majority of the code guaranteed that 
the Hays group could continue monopolistic behavior.” Gomery, supra note 22. 
24 See supra note 23. 
25 EPSTEIN, supra note 6 at 95-96 (The MPEA acted as a single distributor for all of 
the major studios in foreign markets.). 
26 Id. at 96. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 9. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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A. Leadup to Paramount 
 
As America pulled out of the Great Depression, the major studios 
knew they would no longer receive the protection from antitrust 
litigation that they had enjoyed.31 As they increased their production 
of A-list films, Hollywood was hoping that an increase in quality of 
motion pictures would help them escape scrutiny from the Department 
of Justice.32 This plan proved ineffective, as the major studios hit a 
particularly bad slump in 1938, just as a small independent studio led 
by Walt Disney broke through with Snow White and the Seven 
Dwarfs.33 The studios’ struggles, combined with the success of 
Disney, led many to believe that block booking and other tactics had 
led to a sense of complacency from the major studios.34 The 
Department of Justice capitalized on this anti-studio sentiment, filing 
an antitrust suit against the eight major studios—Paramount, Loew’s, 
RKO, Warner Bros., Twentieth Century-Fox, Columbia, Universal, 
and United Artists.35 The Department’s major contentions were that 
block booking and theater ownership constituted illegal restraints of 
trade.36 Shortly after the case went to trial, the studios signed a consent 
 
31 The Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers (SIMPP), The Independent 
Producers and the Paramount Case, 1938-1949: Part 1: The Hollywood Slump of 
1938, HOLLYWOOD RENEGADES ARCHIVE (2005), 
http://www.cobbles.com/simpp_archive/paramountcase_1slump1938.htm 
[https://perma.cc/U6MB-P6AC].  
32 Id. 
33 “By the end of the first quarter of 1938, the combined profits of the Big Eight 
had already dropped 47 percent from the previous year.” Id. Just how big of a 
splash did Disney make with Snow White? It quickly became the highest-grossing 
film of all time. Bill Higgins, Hollywood Flashback: 80 Years Ago, Disney’s ‘Snow 
White’ Set the Animation Standard, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Feb. 1, 2018, 
11:00 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/hollywood-flashback-80-
years-disneys-snow-white-set-animation-standard-1079926 
[https://perma.cc/QAJ2-SVQZ] ( All Time Box Office (Domestic Grosses Adjusted 
for Ticket Price Inflation), BOX OFFICE MOJO (last visited November 8, 2018, 
12:13 AM), https://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/adjusted.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X5MZ-ZGWN] (Adjusted for inflation, the film [Snow White} is 
still one of the ten highest-grossing films ever.).  
34 SIMPP, supra note 31; E.g., U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 140 
(1948). 
35 SIMPP, supra note 31.  
36 SIMPP, The Independent Producers and the Paramount Case, 1938-1949: Part 
2: The Studios Prepare for the Antitrust Battle, 1939, HOLLYWOOD RENEGADES 
ARCHIVE (2005), 
http://www.cobbles.com/simpp_archive/paramountcase_2studios1939.htm 
[https://perma.cc/J8PG-M466]. 
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decree with the Department of Justice.37 The Consent Decree of 1940 
contained a compromise: the Department of Justice agreed to drop the 
suit (and allow studios to retain their theater holdings) if the studios 
limited block booking to only five films per block (as opposed to the 
customary ten films per block)38 and made several other smaller 
concessions.39 However, the Decree contained a provision allowing 
the Department of Justice to re-open the case if there were any 
dissenters to the Decree.40 Universal and Columbia (two studios who 
did not own theaters but relied substantially on block booking) and 
United Artists (who neither owned theaters nor block booked) 
dissented to the Decree, causing it to expire in 1942.41 Consequently, 
the antitrust suit went back to trial in 1945.42 
 
B. United States v. Paramount and the End of the Studio System 
 
With the expiration of the 1940 Decree, the Justice Department 
once again filed suit against the eight major studios, alleging violations 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.43 The complaint divided the eight 
studios into three groups: Paramount, Loew’s, RKO, Warner Bros., 
and Twentieth Century-Fox (the “Big Five”) were studios who, in 
addition to producing and distributing films, also owned and controlled 
theater chains.44 The second group, consisting of Columbia and 
Universal, produced and distributed films but did not own any theater 
chains themselves.45 The third group was comprised solely of United 
Artists, who only acted as a distributor.46 The complaint alleged 
various violations of the Sherman Act, including illegal restraints of 
trade and monopolization.47 
 
 
37 SIMPP, The Independent Producers and the Paramount Case, 1938-1949: Part 
3: The Consent Decree of 1940, HOLLYWOOD RENEGADES ARCHIVE (2005), 
http://www.cobbles.com/simpp_archive/paramountcase_3consent1940.htm 
[https://perma.cc/V55X-5AX5].  
38 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 6. 
39 SIMPP, supra note 37. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 SIMPP, The Independent Producers and the Paramount Case, 1938-1949: Part 
4: The Studios in Federal Court, 1945, HOLLYWOOD RENEGADES ARCHIVE (2005), 
http://www.cobbles.com/simpp_archive/paramountcase_4equity1945.htm.  
43 Paramount, supra note 34 at 140. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 140-141. 
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1. Paramount Reaches the Supreme Court 
 
The case made its way to the Supreme Court in 1948.48 In a lengthy 
opinion, the Court declared that the major studios had violated the 
Sherman Antitrust Act by engaging in illegal restraints of trade.49 The 
Court then addressed several practices that the studios had engaged in 
while maintaining these illegal restraints of trade. 
 
i. Minimum Prices 
 
The Supreme Court found two illegal price-fixing schemes: one 
horizontal scheme between studios, and one vertical scheme between 
the studios and the theaters who licensed their films.50 The studios 
implemented the price-fixing scheme by requiring a minimum 
admissions price when licensing their films to theaters.51 The Court 
compared both schemes to patent owners who require licensees to sell 
the patented invention at a specified price (which is illegal under U.S. 
patent law): “Certainly the rights of the copyright owner are no greater 
than those of the patentee.”52 The Court stated that the price-fixing 
combination was illegal per se,53 noting “the total effect is that... a 
price structure is erected which regulates the licensees’ ability to 
compete against one another in admissions prices.”54 
 
ii. Clearances 
 
Clearances were specified periods of time where only one theater 
in a certain geographic area could be showing a given movie for the 
duration of the period.55 “A “run-clearance-zone” system was 
established: In any defined geographic location (“zone”), a given 
 
48 See Id. (citing to the case generally) 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 142. 
51 Id. at 142-144 (The District Court “found that substantially uniform minimum 
prices had been established in the licenses of all defendants.”). 
52 Id. at 142-144. 
53 Id. at 143 (“We start, of course, from the premise that so far as the Sherman Act 
is concerned, a price-fixing combination is illegal per se.”). 
54 Id. at 143-144. 
55 Anthony D’Alessandro & Anita Busch, Distribs & Exhibs Hold Line on 
Clearances Despite Fox’s Position Change, DEADLINE (Mar. 31, 2016, 4:00 PM), 
https://deadline.com/2016/03/20th-century-fox-exhibition-clearances-circuit-
dealing-1201729061/ [https://perma.cc/ZU92-WRBJ]. Alexandra Gil, Breaking the 
Studios: Antitrust and the Motion Picture Industry, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 83, 
84 (2008).   
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movie played at one theater (“run”), and another theater within the 
same zone could show the same movie only after a defined period 
lapsed (“clearance”).”56 The Supreme Court agreed with the District 
Court that while clearances are not illegal per se, clearances were 
utilized by the defendants in a way that was unreasonable.57 The Court 
found that the clearances used by the defendants “were made 
applicable to situations without regard to the special circumstances 
which are necessary to sustain them as reasonable restraints of trade.”58 
As such, the Court enjoined the studios from utilizing any unjustified 
clearances, placing the burden of proof on the studios to show that any 
future clearances are reasonable.59 
 
iii. Pooling Agreements 
 
The Court found that pooling agreements—agreements both 
between the studios and between studios and theaters to split shared 
profits based on pre-determined percentages (similar to the 
arrangement set up by the MPEA to address overseas markets)60—
were illegal under antitrust law.61 The Court held that the purpose of 
the agreements was to eliminate competition by “nullifying 
competition between the allied theaters” as well as strengthening the 
position of the agreeing parties “against theaters not in the pool.”62 
 
 
 
 
 
56 Orbach, supra note 11, at 336-337.  
57 Paramount, 334 U.S. at 145-148. 
58 Id. Factors to be assessed included “(1) The admission prices of the theatres 
involved, as set by the exhibitors; (2) The character and location of the theatres 
involved, including size, type of entertainment, appointments, transit facilities, etc.; 
(3) The policy of operation of the theatres involved, such as the showing of double 
features, gift nights, give-aways, premiums, cut-rate tickets, lotteries, etc.; (4) The 
rental terms and license fees paid by the theatres involved and the revenues derived 
by the distributor-defendant from such theatres; (5) The extent to which the theatres 
involved compete with each other for patronage; (6) The fact that a theatre 
involved is affiliated with a defendant-distributor or with an independent circuit of 
theatres should be disregarded; and (7) There should be no clearance between 
theatres not in substantial competition.” Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Text accompanying notes 25-27. 
61 Paramount, 334 U.S. at 149.  
62 Id. “Clearer restraints of trade are difficult to imagine.” Id. The Court also struck 
down joint ownership of theaters by two or more studios under similar reasoning. 
Id. at 150 
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iv. Block booking 
 
As explained above, block booking was the practice of forcing 
theaters to license films in blocks, making the licensing of desirable 
films contingent on the licensing of lesser films.63 The Court found 
that block booking constituted an illegal enlargement of the copyright 
monopoly.64 The Court noted that such a practice had already been 
ruled illegal, comparing the conditioning of copyright licensing on the 
purchase of additional works to patent law’s prohibitions on similar 
practices.65 The Court reasoned that copyright protection (and all the 
benefits that come with it) incentivizes public release of the product, 
which is the result of the copyright owner’s “genius.”66 “But the 
reward does not serve its public purpose if it is not related to the quality 
of the copyright.”67 When the licensing of a desired film is conditioned 
on the licensing of a mediocre film, “the latter borrows quality from 
the former and strengthens its monopoly by drawing on the other.”68 
Thus, each film in a block “stands not on its own footing but in whole 
or in part on the appeal which another film may have.”69 Thus, the 
Court ruled that block booking was an illegal restraint on 
competition.70 
 
v. Theater Ownership 
 
The Supreme Court ruled that the Big Five’s theater holdings were 
not illegal per se, but remanded the issue to determine the connection 
between the studios’ theater ownership and the antitrust violations.71 
The Court stated that whether the Big Five’s theater holdings were 
 
63 See text accompanying notes 9-13. 
64 Paramount, 334 U.S. at 156-158. 
65 Id. at 157. 
66 Id. at 158. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 156-159. “We do not suggest that films may not be sold in blocks or 
groups, where there is no requirement, express or implied, for the purchase of more 
than one film. All we hold to be illegal is a refusal to license one or more 
copyrights unless another copyright is accepted.” Id. 
71 Id. at 171-172. “It is the relationship of the unreasonable restraints of trade to the 
position of the defendants in the exhibition field . . . that is of first importance on 
the divestiture of these cases.” Id. The court “set aside the findings of divestiture” 
so that the legality of studio-owned theaters could be addressed on remand. Id. at 
175. 
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illegal would depend on the purpose behind owning theater chains.72 
If the studios’ vertical integration was coupled with an intent to reduce 
competition, rather than a legitimate business interest, their theater 
holdings would be in violation of the Sherman Act.73 
 
2. RKO and Paramount Sign Consent Decrees 
 
After the Paramount decision, RKO quickly announced that it 
would divest of its theater holding.74 RKO signed a consent decree 
with the Justice Department on November 8, 1948, in what would 
prove to be the first domino to fall in divorcing the studios from their 
theaters.75 Paramount quickly followed suit, preferring to sign on to 
voluntary divestiture rather than engage in another expensive legal 
battle.76 Paramount signed its decree with the Justice Department in 
February of 1949.77 
 
3. The District Court Orders Divestiture 
 
On remand, the District Court found that “theatre holdings of the 
[remaining] major defendants have played a vital part in effecting 
violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.”78 The District Court noted 
how minimum pricing, clearances, and pooling agreements were used 
to protect the studios’ theater holdings from competition.79 The Court 
then turned to the geographical distribution of studio-owned theaters.80 
In cities with populations of fewer than 100,000, the Court found “no 
doubt that Paramount, Warner, Fox, and RKO owned or operated 
theatres... without more than trifling competition among 
 
72 Id. at 174. 
73 Id. 
74 The Independent Producers and the Paramount Case, 1938-1949: Part 6: The 
Supreme Court Verdict That Brought an End to the Hollywood Studio System, 
1948, HOLLYWOOD RENEGADES ARCHIVE (2005), 
http://www.cobbles.com/simpp_archive/paramountcase_6supreme1948.htm. The 
weakest of the five theater-owning studios, RKO was eager to see all five studios 
be subjected to divestiture, as a way to put the studios on equal footing. Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-49 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶62, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 3, 1949). 
78 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 85 F. Supp. 881, 887 (1949). 
79 Id. at 885.  
80 Id. at 889-895. 
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themselves.”81 In cities with populations greater than 100,000, “there 
was in general little competition among the defendants, although 
considerably more than in towns of under 100,000.”82 The Court found 
this evidence showed that the geographic distribution of the studios’ 
theater holdings substantially eliminated or limited competition among 
them.83 
 
We do hold that the geographical distribution became a part of 
the system in which competition was largely absent and the 
status of which was maintained by fixed runs, clearances and 
prices, by pooling agreements and joint ownerships among the 
major defendants, and by cross-licensing which made it 
necessary that they should work together. The argument of 
some of the defendants that they had no opportunity to change 
this geographical status not only seems inherently improbable 
but affirmatively contradicted by the making of pooling 
agreements and entering into joint ownerships with one 
another. Moreover, even in the relatively few areas where more 
than one of the major defendants had theatres, competition for 
first-run licensing privileges was generally absent because the 
defendants customarily adhered to a set method in the 
distribution and playing of their films.84 
 
After determining that the studios’ theater holdings were illegal 
restraints of trade, the District Court held that divestiture was the 
appropriate remedy.85 Even in the wake of the RKO and Paramount 
consent decrees, the Court held that “the divorcement we have 
determined to order appears to be the only adequate means of 
terminating the conspiracy and preventing any resurgence of 
monopoly power.”86 
 
 
 
81 Id. at 889. “There appears to be little, if any competition among the five 
defendants . . . in 97% of the towns and in respect to 95% of the theatres in which 
they had interest.” Id. at 890. 
82 Id. Only 27% of the studios’ theaters in these larger cities were in competition 
with each other. Id. at 892. 
83 Id. at 890-892. 
84 Id. at 892-893. 
85 Id. at 895 (explaining why a simple injunction would be inadequate).  
86 Id. at 896 (“[T]he monopoly power might be built up again if the illegal practices 
were not terminated by divorcement, irrespective of the fact that two of the 
conspirators have been eliminated from the controversy by the consent decrees.”). 
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4. The Remaining Studios Sign Consent Decrees 
 
After the District Court’s decision in 1949, the remaining three 
theater-owning studios signed consent decrees with the Justice 
Department (Twentieth Century-Fox and Warner Bros. signed their 
respective decrees in 1951, while Loew’s held out on signing its decree 
until 1954).87 
 
III. THE LANDSCAPE OF HOLLYWOOD AFTER THE PARAMOUNT 
DECREES 
 
The Paramount Decrees dramatically reduced the amount of 
control that the major studios enjoyed over the motion picture industry. 
Other players in the industry (most notably theaters and star-level 
actors) suddenly found themselves with leverage against the studios, 
and exercised it accordingly. As a result, the studio’s business model 
changed to correspond with the new challenges they faced. 
 
A. Major Studios Come and Go 
 
Perhaps the biggest change from the Pre-Decrees era is the makeup 
of the major studios. While the eight defendants in Paramount 
included Paramount, Warner Bros., Twentieth Century-Fox, RKO, 
Loew’s, Universal, Columbia, and United Artists, today only six major 
studios exist: Disney, Paramount, Warner Bros., Sony, Twentieth 
Century-Fox (currently in the process of being acquired by Disney)88, 
and Universal.89 
 
87 Twentieth Century-Fox Corp., 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 62, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 7, 1951); Warner Bros. Pictures, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 62, 765 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1951); Loew’s (MGM), 1952-53 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 67, 228 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1952). See Ricard Gil, An Empirical Investigation of the 
Paramount Antitrust Case, 42 APPLIED ECON., Jan. 2010, at 171; U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., supra note 2. By this time, Columbia, Universal, and United Artists had also 
signed consent decrees. Columbia Pictures Corp. (Sony), 1950-51 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 62, 573 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1950); Universal Pictures, 1950-51 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 62, 573 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1950); United Artists, 1950-51 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 62, 573 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1950).  
88 Edmund Lee and Brooks Barnes, Disney and Fox Shareholders Approve Deal, 
Ending Corporate Duel, THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/business/media/disney-fox-merger-vote.html 
[https://perma.cc/GM2E-AQ59].  
89 Anthony D’Alessandro, As Domestic B.O. Hits All-Time $11.37B Record, The 
Industry Wants A Revolution: 2016 Studio Market Share – Update, DEADLINE (Jan. 
3, 2017, 6:37 PM), https://deadline.com/2017/01/highest-grossing-movie-studios-
2016-us-box-office-1201876405/ [https://perma.cc/L8VV-2HA7]. Columbia has 
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B. Studios No Longer Wield Complete Control of the Industry 
 
Due to divesture from their theaters and the prohibition on block 
booking, studios lost the ability to dictate which films theaters were 
required to run.90 Instead, the theater owners themselves are now able 
to choose what movies they want to show on their screens.91 Theater 
owners generally do not give preferences to certain studios, instead 
opting to license films that they think will perform the best at the box 
office.92 Once they divested from their theater holdings, studios also 
lost the ability to leverage censorship codes into blocking independent 
producers from showing their films in theaters.93 Consequently, the 
major studios had newfound competition from smaller studios and 
independent filmmakers for screen time in theaters.94 The amount of 
independent producers increased from virtually none in the pre-
 
since been purchased by Sony. EPSTEIN, supra note 6 at 14-15. After signing its 
Decree, Loew’s split into a theater chain (Loew’s, later acquired by AMC 
Theaters), Gabriel Snyder, AMC, Loews Toast Merger Completion, VARIETY (Jan. 
26, 2006, 3:48 PM), https://variety.com/2006/film/markets-festivals/amc-loews-
toast-merger-completion-1117936927/ [https://perma.cc/E9FF-K4VM],) and a 
production studio (MGM, also later purchased by Sony, Andrew Ross Sorkin, Sony 
Agrees to Buy MGM for Nearly $5 Billion, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 13, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/13/business/media/sony-agrees-to-buy-mgm-
for-nearly-5-billion.html [https://perma.cc/GCW2-M3D8].). EPSTEIN, supra note 6 
at 14-15. RKO was purchased by Viacom, who is also now the parent company of 
Paramount. EPSTEIN, supra note 6 at 14-15. United Artists underwent a series of 
purchases and relaunches, but is no longer a major player in the industry. See David 
Thomson, Dream factory, GUARDIAN: FILM (Fed. 22, 2008, 7:03 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/film/2008/feb/23/film . [https://perma.cc/S8AD-
RUN8].  
90 “Paramount Pictures executives were angry at no longer having first rights to the 
Paramount Theatre screen regardless of the quality of the picture offered.” 
MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE FILM INDUSTRY 111 (1960). 
91 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 17. CONANT, supra note 90 at 110-111. 
92 Id. at 111. “Two legal barriers seemed to operate effectively to bar treatment of 
their former theaters. First, such preferences would violate the divorcement decrees 
and could lead to contempt action against both the distributor and the exhibitor 
circuit. Second, the shares of the four circuits which had completed divorcement 
were publicly held. The officers and directors of each theater firm had a fiduciary 
duty to their firm to maximize its profits by booking those films which they 
honestly thought would accomplish this end. Under this obligation they could not 
legally give continued preference to their former affiliated distributor regardless of 
picture quality. To do so would have subjected these officers and directors to a 
possible shareholders' representative suit in which the corporation might collect 
from them such profits as were lost through their deliberate mismanagement.” Id. 
93 Id. at 113-114. 
94 Id. at 112-113. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 17.  
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Paramount Decrees era to 100 in 1947 and 165 in 1957.95 More 
recently, the major studios produced less than half of the 473 films 
released in 2003,96 a far cry from the domination these studios enjoyed 
prior to the Decrees. 
Theaters and independent producers were not the only ones 
exercising their increased power in the industry: actors began 
dismantling the star system through a series of separate lawsuits 
against the major studios.97 For example, actress Olivia de Haviland 
sued Warner Bros. in 1944.98 The Court ruled that, under §2855 of the 
California Labor Code, personal service contracts could not be 
extended beyond seven calendar years, regardless of how many years 
of “actual service” had been performed.99 The ensuing “De Havilland 
Law” led to the dismantling of the star system and helped usher in the 
free agency system for Hollywood.100 
Freed from the star system, actors and actresses negotiated deals 
as free agents with studios.101 In the late twentieth century, when a 
film’s box office could rise based on the cache of its star,102 studios 
were eager to build and maintain relationships with big-name actors 
 
95 CONANT, supra note 90, at 112-113.  
96 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 17. 
97 See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 2d 225 (1944) 
(challenging the ability of studio to extend contracts beyond seven years). See also 
Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176 (the famous “Bloomer 
Girl” law school case, in which Shirley MacLaine Parker sued Twentieth Century-
Fox for swapping which film it wanted Parker to star in). 
98 De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d.  
99 De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d. “We cannot believe that the phrase ‘for a term not 
beyond a period of seven years’ carries a hidden meaning.” Id. at 232 (discussing 
the change in language of the amended statute from the original.) See Cal. Lab. 
Code. §2855 (Deering 2018).  
100 Jeffrey B. Same, Comment, Breaking the Chokehold: An Analysis of Potential 
Defenses Against Coercive Contracts in Mixed Martial Arts, 2012 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1057, 1077-1080 (2012). “It is commonly accepted that De Haviland and its 
interpretation of section 2855 (sometimes referred to as the ‘de Haviland law’) 
freed actors from the ‘old Hollywood studio system, which hampered or ruined 
many actors’ careers by holding them to long-term contracts’ and initiated an era of 
‘free agency’ for actors. As a result, actors gained the ability to negotiate new 
contracts based on their fair market value.” Note, California Labor Code Section 
2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2632, 2635 (2003). 
101 BEN FRITZ, THE BIG PICTURE: THE FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE OF MOVIES 87 
(2018). 
102 At the time, recruiting A-list actors and actresses was shown to have a positive 
impact on box office performance. Sarah Jane Gilbert, The Box Office Power of 
Stars, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 3, 2005), 
https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/the-box-office-power-of-stars [https://perma.cc/5KEY-
BMPG]. 
333192-OSU_BLJ.indd   164 8/28/19   8:50 AM
 
 
2019] ‘DON’T RUN UP THE STAIRS!’   
 
349 
and actresses. As a result, studios often convinced stars to set up their 
own production companies, and entered into “first-look” deals with 
these one-star companies.103 First-look deals usually involved a studio 
agreeing to cover overhead for producing a film if they could have the 
right of first refusal for any film the star’s production company decided 
to greenlight.104 When stars could still drive audiences to the box 
office, these deals often worked for both parties: actors could make 
(and star in) the movies they wished, and received financial backing 
from the studios to do so. On the other hand, studios were able to build 
strong connections with actors and ensured they continued to keep 
them in their movies.105 However, these deals turned one-sided as stars 
lost their influence as box office drivers.106 
After the Decrees, major studios not only lost their influence to 
other players within the industries; they also faced new competition 
from outside of Hollywood. Television emerged as an alternative form 
of entertainment, and led to a decline in theater audiences.107 Thus, 
distributors could no longer rely on large audiences for their films, and 
instead had to “create” audiences for each upcoming film.108 In order 
to entice viewers to head to the box office, massive amounts were spent 
on marketing upcoming films.109 
 
C. Cost of Production Increases 
 
The Paramount Decrees led to a skyrocketing of production costs 
for movies.110 The average production cost more than doubled in just 
 
103 FRITZ, supra note 101, at 87. These arrangements did not guarantee that a star 
would work exclusively with one studio, but first-look deals were integral in 
earning the loyalty of coveted actors and actresses. Id. 
104 Id. 
105 “That’s why Clint Eastwood has made so many movies for Warner Bros., 
Leonardo DiCaprio for Paramount, and James Cameron for Fox. Id. 
106 Id. at 93-99. Household-name actors are no longer reliable in attracting 
audiences. EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, THE HOLLYWOOD ECONOMIST 151 2d ed. 
(2012). 
107 Theater attendance declined from 60% in the 1940s to less than 10% in 1964. 
Caterina Cowden, Movie Attendance Has Been On A Dismal Decline Since The 
1940s, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 6, 2015, 7:35 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/movie-attendance-over-the-years-2015-1. 
[https://perma.cc/4URG-5TMM].  
108 EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 149-160 (describing the major-studio marketing 
strategies). E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 6 at 175-190 (detailing the various stages of 
“audience creation”). 
109 Supra note 108. 
110 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 18. 
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three years, rising from $732,000 in 1947111 to $1,800,000 in 1950.112 
And costs only continued to increase over time.113 Even after adjusting 
for inflation, “the cost of producing films had increased more than 
sixteen times since the collapse of the studio system.”114 
As they lost the ability to force low-quality movies onto theaters, 
studios became unable to churn out movies with factory-style 
efficiency.115 Instead, film production now requires adequate attention 
to ensure the film would be appealing to theaters (and their 
audiences).116 Studios now make box office projections prior to a film 
being greenlit, and a film is judged based on whether they meet 
projections, not simply whether they are profitable.117  
 
D. Using Blockbusters to Capitalize on Licensing and Home 
Entertainment 
 
Due to the new competition and increased costs, the major studios 
adapted their business model, with studios placing less emphasis on 
the box office and more emphasis on opportunities for home 
entertainment and intellectual property licensing.118 Today, the actual 
box office is no longer a source of significant revenue for the major 
studios.119 In fact, most films’ box office revenue fails to cover their 
costs.120 
 
111 Id. at 9. 
112 CONANT, supra note 90, at 116. Paramount Pictures was able to keep their costs 
slightly lower than its competitors, with an average production cost of $1,144,000 
for the 25 films it produced in 1950. Id. 
113 The average production cost in 2003 was $63.8 million. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, 
at 18. 
114 Id. 
115 Supra text accompanying notes 5-31. 
116 See EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 149-157. 
117 FRITZ, supra note 101, at 31-32. 
118 Adam Davidson, How Does the Film Industry Actually Make Money?, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (Jun. 26, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/magazine/how-does-the-film-industry-
actually-make-money.html. [https://perma.cc/9CUL-9RJT]. EPSTEIN, supra note 6 
at 225-228. 
119 The percentage of studios’ revenue coming from the box office decline from 
100% in 1948 to 53% in 1980 to just 18% in 2003. Id. at 20. 
120 Id. at 16. Determining the profitability of a film is not as simple as comparing 
box office receipts to the production budget; a studio often has to split the box 
office revenue with other entities, and the production budget does not account for 
the extraordinary expense of marketing a film in order to create audience 
awareness. For an in-depth look at the opaque accounting methods used in the film 
industry, see EPSTEIN, supra note 106. 
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With the box office diminishing as a revenue source, studios 
needed to find other ways to make a profit. Home entertainment and 
IP licensing became major sources of revenue, eventually becoming 
the focus of the business.  Theater windows (the time a movie would 
run in theaters prior to being released in home entertainment format) 
shortened in order to capitalize on the home entertainment market.121 
Studios also had to find a way to differentiate themselves from 
television programming in order to attract audiences to theaters. The 
solution was to turn movies into “events,” filled with special effects 
and action that could not be replicated by TV. This led to an increase 
of costs, on top of the expenses added as a result of the Paramount 
Decrees.122 
As the cost of producing a film increased, studios began making 
less films. The largest film distributors in the U.S. released 290 films 
in 1947.123 By 1954 (the year the final Paramount defendant had 
signed its Consent Decree), however, the number of releases had 
declined to 269.124 And the number of releases continues to decline to 
this day. The major studios accounted for just 93 movies releases in 
2016, 79 releases in 2017, and 85 releases in 2018.125 Disney, the 
current leader among studios, serves as a microcosm: the studio’s 
annual releases have declined from 30 in 2005 to 21 in 2007 to just 10 
in 2013.   
A decrease in the number of films meant that each film took on 
greater importance with respect to a studio’s bottom line, and, as a 
result, producing a film became a risky endeavor. Studios began 
looking for ways to reduce the risk involved in producing and 
distributing movies. They began leaning heavily on big-name actors, 
and more recently, recognizable intellectual property. Existing 
intellectual property reduced the costs of advertising a film (since 
audiences had existing awareness of the franchise) as well as making 
it easier to project a film’s success. “The main task of today’s studio is 
to collect fees for the use of the intellectual properties they control in 
one form or another and then to allocate those fees among the parties—
including themselves—who create, develop, and finance the 
 
121 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 214-215. 
122 EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 41-43. 
123 CONANT, supra note 90, at 120. The number of releases actually reached as 
many as 352 in 1951. Id. 
124 Id. “By 1954 most of the leading producer-distributors had adopted a policy of 
fewer, more expensive films.” Id. 
125 Domestic Movie Theatrical Market Summary 1995 to 2018, THE NUMBERS (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2018, 8:22 PM), https://www.the-numbers.com/market/. 
[https://perma.cc/FF3Z-QGKN]. 
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properties.”126 43 of the top 50 highest grossing movies from 2012-
2016 were based on existing properties or franchises.127 
Disney has taken the franchise model to an extreme. The studio 
now only releases movies from the Marvel and Star Wars franchises, 
remakes and reboots of existing Disney properties, and a few original 
animated family films.128 “Disney isn’t in the movie business...It’s in 
the Disney brands business. Movies are meant to serve those brands. 
Not the other way around.”129 
Whatever one thinks of the artistic merits of Disney’s strategy, it 
is difficult to say that it is anything other than a success financially. 
From 2013-2016, “Disney has ranked number one or number two at 
the box office every year, despite consistently releasing fewer movies 
than the other five major studios.”130 During that time period, Disney 
is responsible for 18 of the 40 highest grossing films.131 From 2014-
2016, Disney’s profit margin more than doubled those of other 
studios132 Disney’s 2017 profit margin was nearly 28%, compared to 
Warner Bros.’ 13%, Universal’s 17%, Fox’s 8%, Sony’s 4%, and 
Paramount’s -7%.133 
Nowhere is the success of Disney’s IP-heavy business model more 
apparent than with the Marvel franchise. Disney does not simply 
capitalize on existing well-known characters with the Marvel 
franchise, but has turned the brand into a “cinematic universe,” setting 
each film (and its characters) in the same fictional reality.134 This 
connects each Marvel film to one another even when they are not linear 
sequels to each other. “Marvel Studios had the business insight, 
completely new at the time, that by linking movies with different 
characters, it could get the benefit of sequels without having to wait 
two or three years to reunite the same actors.”135 
 
126 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 107. 
127 FRITZ, supra note 101 at xix. 
128 Id. at 144. 
129 Id. at 145-146. 
130 Id. at 144. 
131 Id. 
132 “Disney’s motion-picture profit margin reached 21 percent in fiscal 2014, 24 
percent in 2015, and 29 percent in 2016.” Id. at 162. Other major studios were 
“maxing out” at a profit margin of 10% during the same time period. Id. at 144. 
133 See Paul Bond & Georg Szalai, Studio-by-Studio Profit Report: Disney Reigns, 
Viacom Stems Losses, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Feb. 23, 2018, 5:45 AM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/studio-by-studio-profit-report-disney-
reigns-viacom-stems-losses-1086505. [https://perma.cc/P7EQ-S4Z4]. 
134 FRITZ, supra note 101, at 66. 
135 Id. at 66. 
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Each Marvel film usually includes one or more post-film 
“stingers,” short clips featuring characters from upcoming films and 
alluding to future events within the cinematic universe.136 These 
stingers are used as a sort of in-film marketing, building hype for the 
next Marvel film before the audience has even left the theater, and 
tying seemingly-unrelated storylines together.137 By keeping every 
movie connected within the universe, Disney has turned each Marvel 
movie into a “quasi-sequel,” which serves to make revenues and costs 
for future projects more predictable.138 
The Marvel universe has had unprecedented success unlike any 
other movie franchise. As of December 1, 2018, Marvel’s 20 releases 
have grossed more than $6.8 billion domestically, with an average 
domestic box office of $343 million.139 Marvel also boasts three of the 
top ten highest grossing domestic films (Black Panther, Avengers: 
Infinity War, and The Avengers),140 and all three films are in the top 35 
even after adjusting for inflation.141 Infinity War also holds the record 
for opening weekend (both domestically and worldwide) as well as 
being the fastest film to gross $150 million, $200 million, and $250 
million domestically.142 
The increase in franchise films has coincided with another trend in 
the industry: after the Paramount Decrees, studios began targeting 
younger audiences more and more.143 Not only does the younger 
 
136 Alex Suskind, You’re Still Here?’: A Brief History of the Movie Post-Credits 
Sequence, VULTURE: BRIEF HISTORIES (Apr. 8, 2014), 
https://www.vulture.com/2014/04/brief-history-of-movie-post-credits-
sequences.html. [https://perma.cc/2CGW-94TM]. 
137 Id. 
138 FRITZ, supra note 101, at 67. 
139 Franchises: Marvel Cinematic Universe. BOX OFFICE MOJO (last visited 
December 1, 2018, 6:55 PM), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/franchises/chart/?id=avengers.htm. 
[https://perma.cc/SN9R-HT2Y]. 
140 All Time Box Office: Domestic Grosses, BOX OFFICE MOJO (last visited 
December 1, 2018, 6:55 PM), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/domestic.htm. [https://perma.cc/A93G-
S3KW]. 
141 All Time Box Office: Domestic Grosses Adjusted for Ticket Price Inflation, BOX 
OFFICE MOJO (last visited December 1, 2018, 6:55 PM), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/adjusted.htm. [https://perma.cc/NL3N-
JTME]. 
142 All Time Box Office: All Time Records (By Record Holder), BOX OFFICE MOJO 
(last visited December 1, 2018, 6:55 PM), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/?page=byrecord&p=.htm. 
[https://perma.cc/4CNX-H8ZU]. 
143 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 20. EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 151-157. 
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demographic have more free time to go to the theaters, they also spend 
more time watching TV (and thus are more susceptible to TV 
advertising). It is also easier to market intellectual property-licensed 
products (such as toys, video games, and apparel) to children and 
teenagers than it is to adults.144 Almost half of all box office revenue 
came from films rated PG-13 (targeted at the crucial teenage 
market).145 
 
E. Studios Find Other Ways to Reduce Risk 
 
Besides a reliance on big-budget franchise blockbuster, studios 
have also used other methods to reduce their risk. The distribution 
portion of the business has taken on a greater importance since the 
Decrees, with studios acting as distributors even for films that they did 
not produce themselves.146 Despite the Decrees’ attempts at breaking 
up monopolization, major studios still dominate the distribution 
channels because theater chains believe that major studios are the only 
entities with the capability to handle large scale releases and generate 
the required audience awareness.147 As a result, studios maintain a 
close relationship with theater chains and continue to have leverage in 
scheduling and booking the release calendar.148 Acting as distributors 
allows the studios to retain control of royalty and fee calculations. 
Usually, complicated formulas are used to ensure studios retain as 
much of the profit for a given movie as possible, before allocating the 
other parties their share of the proceeds.149 
Movie studios are still engaging in activities that seem similar to 
the type of behavior prohibited by the Paramount Decrees. The 
theatrical release calendar is built around studios cooperating with 
each other to avoid head-to-head competition between similar 
movies.150 This cooperation is dependent upon information provided 
 
144 Id. 
145 Market Charts: MPAA Ratings, THE NUMBERS (last visited Nov. 28, 2018, 
10:51 PM), https://www.the-numbers.com/market/mpaa-ratings. 
[https://perma.cc/Z7HS-J7RE]. 
146 “Each of the big six studios, Warner Bros., Disney, Fox, Sony, Paramount, and 
Universal, has a wholly owned distribution arm that distributes titles that it 
finances, titles that it co-finances with partners, and titles produced and financed by 
outside production companies and so-called studio-less studios.” EPSTEIN, supra 
note 106 at 112. 
147 Id. at 112-113. 
148 Id. 
149 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 119-125. 
150 EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 138-142. 
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by the National Research Group (NRG).151 NRG polls potential 
moviegoers to determine the demographic appeal of specific movies, 
and then compiles this information into a weekly “Competitive 
Positioning” report, which is then supplied to each of the major 
studios.152 If the report shows that two films marketed to the same 
demographic group are set to be released on the same weekend (and 
thus eating into each other’s potential profit), one of the studios will 
choose a different release date for their movie (often the movie 
showing lower levels of awareness in the report) in order to avoid the 
head-to-head conflict (and thus maximize each films’ profit).153 This 
system has avoided antitrust scrutiny because there is no direct 
communication between the studios; NRG acts as an intermediary, 
providing a standard basis of information and helping orchestrate 
cooperation.154 
Another aspect of the industry that some consider to be 
anticompetitive is the system of uniform pricing for theatrical releases 
that has been in place since 1970.155 With the exception of some 
variance that has nothing to do with perceived quality of the films, 
ticket prices for all movies are generally the same.156 Even after initial 
release (when interest can be quantified), prices remain uniform, 
regardless of the positive or negative reception a film receives.157 
Some wonder whether this is really any different than the minimum 
pricing or block booking schemes utilized in the pre-Decrees era.158 
 
 
 
 
151 Id. NRG has exclusive contracts with each of the major studios, ensuring that it 
is the sole provider of demographic-appeal information for the studios’ movies. Id. 
“Because of this monopoly of information, the report provides the studios with a 
common basis on which to make their scheduling decisions.” Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 97. 
155 See Orbach, supra note 11, at 317-318. 
156 Reynolds, supra note 11, at 14-16. 
157 Id. at 36-37 (explaining the difficulties in attempting to adjust prices after initial 
release, particularly that lowering price post-release could cause potential viewers 
“to second-guess whether a film is worth their time.”). 
158 “By averaging ticket prices, exhibitors are economically tying one product to 
another, similar to block-booking.” Id. at 19. “Uniform pricing practices are thus in 
many ways a scheme unfriendly to moviegoers. Rather than set a reduced price for 
a film forecasted to be worth less to audiences, distributors (and thus exhibitors 
under their influence) hope that enough people will be duped into paying a uniform 
inflated price to make up for the lessened demand for the film and the underpricing 
of higher-value films.” Id. 
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IV. REMOVING THE DECREES 
 
The Decrees have shaped the twists and turns Hollywood has taken 
since 1948; they may cease to do so in the very near future. The 
Department of Justice is currently reviewing the Paramount Decrees 
as part of a broader deregulation effort aimed at “outdated” antitrust 
provisions.159 In explaining the need for review, the Department cited 
the dramatic changes in the film industry: 
 
“The Paramount Decrees have been on the books with no 
sunset provisions since 1949,” the Justice Department’s 
antitrust chief Makan Delrahim said in a statement. “Much has 
changed in the motion picture industry since that time. It is high 
time that these and other legacy judgments are examined to 
determine whether they still serve to protect competition.”160 
 
The questions specifically posed by the Department of Justice 
include: whether the Decrees’ restrictions on various practices are still 
needed to protect competition; whether any of these restrictions 
ineffective or have anticompetitive effects; whether any modifications 
would enhance competition; what the effect of terminating the Decrees 
would be; whether changes in the industry have rendered the Decrees 
unnecessary; and whether existing antitrust law is sufficient to protect 
competition in Hollywood.161 The Department’s request for public 
input has not gone unnoticed. Numerous comments have been filed 
with the Department, mainly from independent theater chains 
espousing the necessity of the Decrees’ antitrust restrictions.162 
In any event, the actual effectiveness of any rollback of the Decrees 
would likely depend on judiciary action (to overturn Paramount).163 
However, studios could see any action by the  Department of Justice 
as a signal to begin testing the courts’ tolerance for previously 
prohibited conduct.164 The Supreme Court may decide that restrictions 
 
159 Supra note 2.  
160 Faughnder, supra note 2. 
161 THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 1.  
162 THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PARAMOUNT CONSENT DECREE 
REVIEW PUBLIC COMMENTS 2018 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/paramount-
consent-decree-review-public-comments-2018#comments.  
163 See Gardner, supra note 2. 
164 “If we assume that the Consent Decrees restrained the industry from excessively 
unfair pacts, what will happen if they are struck down? Will the studios begin 
flexing their muscles and seeing what they can get away with under antitrust laws? 
It’s just a matter of time before we know.” Reconsidering the Consent Decrees, 
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on practices such a block booking and clearances are no longer 
appropriate in today’s entertainment environment.165 
In fact, several recent lawsuits have alleged antitrust violations 
from large theater chains, alleging that these chains used their control 
of the market to obtain exclusive licenses with studios that prevent 
smaller theaters from screening popular films.166 One ongoing case 
recently survived a motion to dismiss, with the D.C. District Court 
concluding that the plaintiffs (a group of small theaters) sufficiently 
alleged that the defendant (the national chain Landmark Theatres) 
committed antitrust violations.167 While the major studios have not 
been named as parties in any of these cases, “those studios are said to 
have acquiesced” to major theater chains’ demands for exclusive 
licenses.168 Such a relationship between major studios and theater 
chains hearkens back to the pre-Paramount era when studios enjoyed 
control over theaters to the detriment of the less influential players in 
Hollywood.  
 
 
 
 
FILM JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 6, 2018), 
http://www.filmjournal.com/columns/reconsidering-consent-decrees.  
165 Eriq Gardner, The Real Impact of Getting Rid of the Paramount Consent 
Decrees, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Aug. 16, 2018, 6:55 AM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/real-impact-getting-rid-paramount-
consent-decrees-1134938. 
166 Eriq Gardner, Antitrust Lawsuit Accuses AMC Entertainment of Hurting 
Hispanic Community via Studios Pacts, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 21, 
2015, 9:15 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/antitrust-lawsuit-
accuses-amc-entertainment-790440. Eriq Gardner, Regal Said to Have Abused 
Movie Theater Monopoly in Nation’s Capital, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 
27, 2016, 7:30 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/regal-said-have-
abused-movie-859747. Lawsuits against AMC and Regal, respectively, have since 
been settled out of court. Ashley Cullins, AMC Settles Lawsuit Over Alleged 
Conspiracy With Major Studios, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Sept. 14, 2018, 6:59 
PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/amc-settles-lawsuit-viva-
cinemas-alleged-conspiracy-major-studios-1143574. Eriq Gardner, Regal Settles 
Monopoly Suit Led by Mark Cuban’s Landmark Theatres, THE HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER (Aug. 4, 2016, 4:07 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/regal-settles-monopoly-suit-led-922636.  
167 2301 M Cinema LLC v. Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 167176, at *25 (D.D.C. 2018). Eriq Gardner, Mark Cuban's Landmark 
Theatres Must Face Antitrust Lawsuit, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 1, 2018 
9:27 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/mark-cubans-landmark-
theatres-face-antitrust-lawsuit-1148226.  
168 Gardner, supra note 166.  
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A. Removing the Decrees Could Provide the Freedom Necessary to 
Fend Off New Competition 
 
One main concern in Hollywood is that tech giants like Amazon 
and Netflix are looming on the horizon,169 and that studios need more 
freedom in order to compete. Streaming services have already eaten 
into studios’ DVD sales, eroding an important revenue source for the 
studios.170 Unlike the 1940s, consumers now have nearly-limitless 
content offered to them,171 most of it coming from somewhere other 
than Hollywood.172 This content is cheaper to create than a studio-
produced movie,173 and thus can be offered at lower prices to 
consumers.174 Additionally, independent producers, once financed and 
 
169 “Major studios are feeling mounting pressure as Netflix gains a stronger 
foothold in the entertainment market. Netflix retains a $152.29 billion market cap 
in comparison to Viacom’s $12.29 billion and 21st Century Fox’s $84.14 billion.” 
Victoria Graham, Big Movie Studios, Theater Chains Win if Antitrust Rules Lifted, 
ANTITRUST ON BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.bna.com/big-
movie-studios-n73014481670/. 
170 DVD sales fell 11% in 2014 and 12% in 2015. Benjamin Linell, Dealing with 
Uncertainty in the Hollywood Movie Industry, 5, http://www.diva-
portal.se/smash/get/diva2:1118990/FULLTEXT01.pdf 
171 Netflix had over 576 hours of original content on its streaming platform in 2016. 
Samantha Rullo, Here’s How Long It Would Take To Watch Every Single Netflix 
Original Series—INFOGRAPHIC, BUSTLE (Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://www.bustle.com/p/heres-how-long-it-would-take-to-watch-every-single-
netflix-original-series-infographic-35403. 487 original scripted TV programs were 
aired in 2017. John Koblin, 487 Original Programs Aired in 2017. Bet You Didn’t 
Watch Them All., THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/business/media/487-original-programs-
aired-in-2017.html. TV is no longer the only outside competitor movie studios have 
to worry about: over 400 hours of content is uploaded to YouTube per minute, and 
the website’s users are watching an eye-popping one billion hours of videos daily. 
Jack Nicas, YouTube Tops 1 Billion Hours of Video a Day, on Pace to Eclipse TV, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 27, 2017, 1:40 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/youtube-tops-1-billion-hours-of-video-a-day-on-
pace-to-eclipse-tv-1488220851.  
172 See note 169. 
173 For example, the production budget for Netflix’s Stranger Things 2 was $8 
million per episode for nine episodes ($72 million total). Maureen Ryan and 
Cynthia Littleton, TV Series Budgets Hit the Breaking Point as Costs Skyrocket in 
Peak TV Era, VARIETY (Sept. 26, 2017, 8:44 AM), 
https://variety.com/2017/tv/news/tv-series-budgets-costs-rising-peak-tv-
1202570158/. While this was considered a substantial investment relative to other 
TV shows, $72 million for nearly nine hours of content would be a bargain by 
Hollywood standards. See id. 
174 For example, Netflix subscription plans (giving viewers access to the entire 
streaming platform) range from $7.99 to $13.99 per month. Lizzie Plaugic, Netflix 
is raising its prices for US subscribers, THE VERGE (Oct. 5, 2017, 10:02 AM), 
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distributed by the “indie” arms of the major studios,175 are now looking 
to Netflix and Amazon for survival.176 The streaming platforms, 
hungry for content, have been more than happy to oblige them.177 In 
2017, 41 of 119 feature films showed at the Sundance Film Festival 
were purchased.178 Of these 41, 10 were purchased by Netflix, and 
Amazon picked up 5, the highest acquisition totals for both 
companies.179 The freedom that streaming platforms can provide to 
independent filmmakers desperate for an opportunity is “often too 
much...to turn away from.”180 
What’s more, even theaters are starting to look elsewhere as 
studios lose their grip on the industry.181 IMAX has had discussions 
with Amazon, Hulu, and Netflix about releasing each company’s 
respective original content on their screens.182 Indeed, IMAX debuted 
the Netflix original Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: The Green 
 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/5/16429126/netflix-price-raise-standard-
premium-tiers. This is compared to $9.38, which was the average price for a single 
movie ticket in the second quarter of 2018. Pamela McClintock, Average Movie 
Ticket Price Hits Record High of $9.38 in Second Quarter, THE HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER (Jul. 18, 2018, 2:03 PM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/average-movie-ticket-price-hits-record-
high-938-second-quarter-1128169.  
175 “In recent years, many of the indie-boutique shingles that the major studios once 
supported—Paramount Vantage, Warner Independent Pictures—have closed up 
shop... Those that remain, including Fox Searchlight, Miramax, and Focus 
Features, have been weakened.” Sean Fennessey, The End of Independent Film As 
We Know It, THE RINGER (Apr. 10, 2017, 11:49 AM), 
https://www.theringer.com/2017/4/10/16044256/netflix-amazon-studios-
independent-film-sundance-5def390a69ef.  
176 FRITZ, supra note 101, at 187-200. E.g., Fennessey, supra note 175. “‘[Amazon] 
put themselves in the place of Sony Pictures Classics. That’s not really a disruption 
as much as it is a replacement.’” Id. 
177 FRITZ, supra note 101, at 187-200. E.g., Fennessey, supra note 175. “Netflix’s 
insatiable appetite for library-building and content delivery” has led to a splurge of 
financing for original content, including feature films. Id. “Netflix unofficially 
began a new initiative: releasing one new original movie on its streaming service 
every Friday.” Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. “Every single filmmaker I’ve spoken with this year has testified to the 
astonishing freedom the companies provide. ‘If you disagree with a note from 
Netflix or Amazon, you can have a creative discussion about it,’ Gilmore Girls 
creator Amy Sherman-Palladino recently told The Wall Street Journal.” Id. 
181 Andrew Liptak, IMAX might soon be screening Netflix and Amazon originals, 
THE VERGE (Sept. 16, 2018, 10:13 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/16/17866114/imax-streaming-services-netflix-
hulu-amazon-theaters-original-films.  
182 Id. 
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Legend in its theaters in 2015, on the same day it was released on 
Netflix’s streaming platform.183 
Freeing the studios from the restraints of the Paramount Decrees 
could allow them to keep pace with this new competition. Some 
experts think it is unlikely that studios would begin seeking theater 
ownership if the Decrees are removed.184 But tactics like block 
booking and minimum pricing could give studios more leverage in 
negotiations with theaters, in turn giving them more control over the 
exhibition process.185 Block booking small- and mid-budget 
productions with blockbusters could allow smaller movies to become 
a viable enterprise for studios once again.186 Theaters would be 
required to show these smaller budget movies as a requisite to screen 
desired blockbusters.187 
Minimum pricing schemes would help ensure that a studio’s 
percentage of box office receipts substantially covers their production, 
distribution, and advertising costs. This shift in the economics of the 
industry would allow studios to get back into the non-blockbuster 
business188 
Additionally, the leverage gained from these tactics would give 
studios the ability to demand a higher percentage of box office receipts 
from theaters.189 Disney has already begun doing this (as explained 
below), but Disney also has an unrivaled market share as a source of 
leverage.190 
 
 
 
183 Nathan Ingraham, Netflix’s first original movie will be a sequel to ‘Crouching 
Tiger, Hidden Dragon’, THE VERGE (Sept. 29, 2014, 9:36 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2014/9/29/6870271/netflix-first-original-movie-will-be-
a-sequel-to-crouching-tiger-hidden-dragon. 
184 Graham, supra note 169. 
185 See Id. 
186 Studios “could shift their focus on producing more content instead of just a few 
blockbuster hits.” Id. 
187 Supra notes 11-15, and accompanying text. 
188 Studios have stopped producing mid-budget movies because the expected 
profits are miniscule when compared to the expected return from big-budget 
blockbusters, with a higher risk of losing money on these smaller productions. 
FRITZ, supra note 101, at 112-116. 
189 Text accompanying notes 5-31. 
190 As of November 25, Disney has accounted for 27% of 2018’s box office, almost 
double second-place Universal (15.3%). Studio Market Share: 2018, BOX OFFICE 
MOJO (last visited Nov. 29, 2018, 12:28 PM), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/studio/?view=company&view2=yearly&yr=2018
&p=.htm. This market share is only expected to increase once Disney acquires 
Twentieth Century-Fox, who had 9.5% of the box office as of November 25. Id. 
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B. Removing the Decrees is Likely to Create More Harm Than Good 
 
The initial thought that removing the Decrees would help the 
studios is tempting. After all, what company wouldn’t benefit from 
more control over their industry? However, a closer look at the 
Decrees’ removal show counterproductive effects. Freeing the studios 
from antitrust restraints would have a negative impact on independent 
producers as well as theater chains whom the studios currently rely on. 
Additionally, removing the Decrees would also eliminate any 
roadblocks preventing tech companies from entering Hollywood. 
Thus, while the studios might temporarily enjoy greater control over 
Hollywood without the Decrees, the likes of Amazon and Netflix 
would enjoy unfettered access as vertically-integrated production 
companies in short order.  
 
1. Eliminating the Decrees Would Have Negative Effects on 
Other Players in Hollywood 
 
Even assuming the studios would benefit by removing the Decrees, 
others in the industry would almost certainly be harmed by it. Block 
booking and other methods of control over theaters could threaten 
niche independent producers that are thriving in the current 
environment. For example, Blumhouse Productions, a small 
production studio headed by Jason Blum, has cornered the market on 
the modern horror genre, turning low-budget productions into 
enormous box office gains.191 With hits like the Paranormal Activity 
series, Split, the critically-acclaimed Get Out, and 2018’s Halloween, 
Blumhouse regularly overperforms its size at the box office, with five 
of the studio’s films grossing over $100 million domestically,192 and 
thirteen more films grossing more than $50 million193 (all one 
shoestring budgets).194 Rather than feeling constrained by its limited 
 
191 Emily Canal, How This Small Production Studio Is Turning Dirt-Cheap Budgets 
Into Millions at the Box Office, INC., https://www.inc.com/emily-canal/blumhouse-
productions-get-out.html. 
192 As of November 2018. Blumhouse Productions, BOX OFFICE MOJO (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2018, 9:00 PM), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/franchises/chart/?id=bhouse.htm.  
193 Id. 
194 Blumhouse generally spends about $5 million or less on an original and up to 
about $10 million on a sequel. Canal, supra note 191. The production budget for 
each of these films are as follows: Get Out—$4.5 million; Halloween—$10 
million; Split—$9 million; Paranormal Activity—an astonishingly frugal $15,000; 
Paranormal Activity 3—$5 million; Paranormal Activity 2—$3 million; Insidious 
Chapter 2—$5 million; The Purge: Election Year—$10 million; The Purge: 
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resources, Blumhouse actually attributes its success to being 
financially limited, explaining that its modest budgets require its 
directors to think outside the box.195 The result are creative movies that 
explore new ideas and themes within the horror genre.196 
 
Anarchy—$9 million; The First Purge—$13 million; Insidious: The Last Key—
$10 million; The Visit—$5 million; The Purge—$3 million; Happy Death Day—
$4.8 million; Insidious—$1.5 million; Paranormal Activity 4—$5 million; 
Insidious Chapter 3—$10 million; and Ouija—$5 million. Get Out, BOX OFFICE 
MOJO, https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=blumhouse2.htm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2018, 9:00 PM); Halloween, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=halloween2018.htm (last visited Nov. 
4, 2018, 9:00 PM); Split, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=split2017.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 
2018, 9:00 PM); Paranormal Activity, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=paranormalactivity.htm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2018, 9:00 PM); Paranormal Activity 3, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=paranormalactivity3.htm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2018, 9:00 PM); Paranormal Activity 2, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=paranormalactivity2.htm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2018, 9:00 PM); Insidious Chapter 2, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=insidious2.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 
2018, 9:00 PM);  The Purge: Election Year, BOX OFFICE MOJO,  
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=purge3.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2018, 
9:00 PM); The Purge: Anarchy, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=purge2.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2018, 
9:00 PM); The First Purge, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=purge4.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2018, 
9:00 PM); Insidious: The Last Key, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=insidious4.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 
2018, 9:00 PM); The Visit, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=blumhouse2015.htm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2018, 9:00 PM); The Purge, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=purge.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2018, 
9:00 PM); Happy Death Day, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=blumhousehorror2018.htm (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2018, 9:00 PM); Insidious, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=insidious.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 
2018, 9:00 PM); Paranormal Activity 4, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=paranormalactivity4.htm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2018, 9:00 PM); Insidious Chapter 3, BOX OFFICE MOJO,  
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=insidiouschapter3.htm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2018, 9:00 PM); Ouija, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=ouija.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2018, 
9:00 PM). In all, the eighteen films have cumulatively grossed over $1.5 billion at 
the domestic box office, on a combined budget of $109.8 million. 
195 Canal, supra note 191. 
196 "One of the things that has been great about the response to Get Out, it 
acknowledges that you can make interesting, challenging movies that happen to be 
horror thrillers," says Couper Samuelson, 37, the president of feature films for 
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Other independent studios have been started from scratch.197 These 
newcomers mainly focus on the mid-budget films that have largely 
been abandoned by the major studios.198 New independents have 
actually found it easier to start lean and build up rather than a studio 
who attempts to downsize.199 Unlike major studios, which “were built 
for an age of abundant profits” and annual slates of 20-30 films, these 
new independents have been able to maintain low overhead costs, 
lowering the risk of financial disaster due to box office flops.200  
Because of their low overhead costs, the economics of non-franchise 
films make sense for smaller studios.201 For example, 2.0 
Entertainment, headed by a former Sony executive, estimates that it 
needs just four or five box office hits out of its twenty-movie slate in 
order to be successful.202 
Allowing the major studios to engage in block booking would 
prove catastrophic for small, independent studios like Blumhouse or 
2.0 Entertainment. If major studios are once again allowed to make the 
licensing of their blockbusters contingent on theaters also agreeing to 
run their lower budget films, independent studios could be crowded 
out of theaters. If theater chains now have to devote their screens to, 
say, low-budget Disney films in order to license the next Avengers 
movie, then there are fewer screens available to show low-budget 
productions from studios like Blumhouse who are currently serving a 
need in the market (and reaping the benefits from it).203 The motion 
picture industry saw a huge increase in independent studios after the 
implementation of the Paramount Decrees204; it could be true that 
removing the Decrees leads to the opposite outcome, with independent 
studios being crowded back out of the market. 
 
[Blumhouse Productions]. "It kind of emboldens us to make sure that there are 
galvanic and interesting ideas in our scary movies." Id. The success of 
Blumhouse’s business model has not gone unnoticed: one box office analyst says 
that Blumhouse is “doing it right, perfectly, in fact in terms of Hollywood 
structure.” Id. 
197 FRITZ, supra note 101, at 221-230. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 228. The head of 2.0 Entertainment “planned to employ no more than a 
dozen people at his company, including a few creative executives to help him 
develop and makes the movies, along with business and legal staff.” Id. 
201 While middle-budget films provide little upside to the major studios, “the 
benefits...are actually meaningful” to these new smaller studios. Id. at 221-230. 
202 Id. at 228. 
203 See notes 191-96 and accompanying text. 
204 See notes 90-96 and accompanying text. 
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Removing the Decrees would also harm theater chains. While 
minimum pricing requirements would allow studios to ensure their 
share of the box office adequately covers their cost, this tactic poses a 
substantial risk for theaters. Price elasticity at the box office is 
notoriously difficult to gauge with any sort of certainty.205 If the 
public’s demand for movies in theaters is relatively inelastic, 
increasing prices would provide an opportunity for the studios to 
increase their profits at the box office, since raising prices would not 
cause a drop in attendance.206 However, if the demand for movies in 
theaters is relatively elastic, higher prices could result in lower 
attendance (and thus lower box office receipts for the studios).207 
Although it’s unclear how audiences would react to uniformly higher 
prices, there is some evidence to suggest that it could lead to more and 
more viewers opting to stay home,208 especially with the rise of in-
home entertainment options.209 Even if higher prices don’t cause 
audiences to stay away from the box office, increased ticket prices 
could lead to decreased spending at the concession stand, where theater 
chains currently make most of their profit.210 
Another current concern of theater chains is the consolidation of 
studios, particularly the recently-approved Disney-Fox merger.211 
 
205 Orbach & Einav, supra note 11, at 149. 
206 See Reynolds, supra note 11, at 31. 
207 See Id. 
208 See Elain Schwartz, 2 Reasons We Don’t Go to the Movies, ECONLIFE (Mar. 29 
2014), https://econlife.com/2014/03/price-elasticity-and-substitutes-diminish-
movie-goers/. Theater attendance decline from 1999-2011 as price increases 
outpaced inflation during that period. Michael Cieply, Charging a Premium for 
Movies, at a Cost, THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 31, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/business/media/as-ticket-prices-rise-theater-
audiences-
shrink.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&mtrref=undefined&gwh=D652A26DA25976
DFA9BD380E208E4DC1&gwt=pay.  
209 See Mike Snider, Theaters taking hits from movie viewing at home, weak box 
office, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2017, 8:05 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2017/08/02/movie-theaters-
getting-pinched-sluggish-box-office-movies-viewing-home/532256001/; but see 
Andrew Arnold, Convenience Vs. Experience: Millennials Love Streaming But 
Aren’t Ready To Dump Cinema Just Yet, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2017, 4:17 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewarnold/2017/10/26/millennials-love-
streaming-but-arent-ready-to-dump-cinema-just-yet/#509c8ae16311 (exploring 
millennials’ interest in the theater-going experience).  
210 EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 25-27. Ben Geier, The sneaky way movie theaters 
are making up for falling ticket sales, FORTUNE (Feb. 18, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/02/18/movie-theaters-concessions/.  
211 Dawn C. Chmielewski, Congressional Democrats Call for Disney-Fox 
Hearings Amid Antitrust Concerns, DEADLINE (Dec. 18, 2017, 3:32 PM), 
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Disney is positioning the merger as a defensive tactic against 
competition from the tech companies in the entertainment industry, but 
skeptics are worried it is another step in Disney’s journey to becoming 
a monopoly.212 After the merger, Disney will account for 40% of the 
box office, plus a controlling stake in Hulu213 (as well as its own 
streaming service Disney+, launching in 2019).214 
Will the merger give Disney too much leverage in negotiations 
with theaters? The studio has already begun asking for a higher 
percentage of box office receipts for its films, as it did with Star Wars: 
The Last Jedi in 2017.215 If Disney applies the same tactic to upcoming 
movies (featuring the intellectual property from both Disney and Fox), 
many theaters will no longer retain a sufficient percentage of box 
office receipts to cover their costs.216 Theaters would have to increase 
ticket and concession prices in order to survive.217 In addition, this 
leverage could be similarly applied in the home entertainment 
sector.218 
If anything, critics argue, antitrust regulation (or deregulation) 
should be tilted more in favor of theaters.219 Theater chains are already 
 
https://deadline.com/2017/12/disney-fox-antitrust-concerns-congressional-
hearings-request-1202228114/ [https://perma.cc/TU9X-UF5B] (“Sen. Amy 
Klobuchar (D-MN), the ranking Democrat on the Senate subcommittee, requested a 
hearing on the proposed mega-deal, echoing concerns voiced by advocates who 
worry the $66 billion deal would concentrate too much power in the hands of a 
single Hollywood studio, and result in consumers paying higher prices for 
entertainment.”). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Chaim Gartenberg, Disney’s long-awaited streaming service will be called 
Disney+, THE VERGE (Nov. 8, 2018, 5:35 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/8/18077014/disney-plus-streaming-service-
marvel-star-wars-loki-tom-hiddleston [https://perma.cc/7JQS-2FFL].  
215 Jason Guerrasio, Disney’s requirements for the new ‘Star Wars’ movie have 
angered some movie theaters, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:02 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/disney-requirements-to-show-star-wars-the-last-
jedi-in-theaters-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/8WNR-BVCK]; Disney required 
theaters to send 65% of ticket sale revenue to the studio in order to screen The Last 
Jedi, while most studios receive only 55%-60% of box office receipts from 
theaters. Id. 
216 Trevor Norkey, How the Disney-Fox Merger Will Crush Rival Studios and 
Impact Exhibitors, MOVIEWEB (July 28, 2018), https://movieweb.com/disney-fox-
deal-change-theaters-impact-movie-studios/ [https://perma.cc/6RU2-CYXA].  
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Ryan Faughnder, supra note 2 (“‘The relationship between studios and theaters 
is under pressure,’ said Jason E. Squire, a movie business professor at University of 
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being squeezed as Disney claims a higher percentage of box office 
receipts.220 Major theater chains can tolerate Disney’s demands, “but 
for small independent theaters, this could cripple their business. So that 
some independently-owned theaters have decided not to play ‘The Last 
Jedi.’”221 Thus, the increased leverage (from removing the Decrees) 
that the studios would enjoy over the theaters would be accompanied 
by an increased burden on theater chains, making it even more difficult 
for them to stay profitable.222 Unlike studios, who can find ways to 
maximize revenues from streaming and home entertainment, theaters 
have few options to supplement revenues as more and more viewers 
opt to watch films in-home rather than in the theater.223 
 
2. Removing the Decrees Could Provide Fully-Integrated Tech 
Companies a Path to Control 
 
It is far from clear that getting rid of the Decrees would help, rather 
than hurt, the studios. Proponents of eliminating the Decrees state that 
it would help the studios compete against Netflix and Amazon,224 who 
have been increasingly encroaching the motion picture production 
industry.225 But the studios’ freedom from the antitrust restraints of the 
Decrees would also be enjoyed by their new Silicon Valley 
competitors. As a result, removing the Decrees could backfire on the 
studios, accelerating the very outcome they are seeking to prevent. 
 
Southern California. ‘If anything should change, it should be in favor of the 
exhibitor. I don't see how returning to block booking is going to help theaters.’”). 
220 Guerrasio, supra note 215. 
221 Id. 
222 See Ryan Faughnder, supra note 2.  
223 Jason Guerrasio, Hollywood is fighting billionaire Sean Parker's plan to let you 
rent movies still in theaters for $50, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 31, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/sean-parker-screening-room-backlash-2017-5 
[https://perma.cc/LN7U-GY6G]. Premium “day-and-date” in-home movie services 
have been rejected by theater chains over the concern that the loss of a theatrical 
window would leave theaters without the revenue sources necessary to stay afloat. 
Id.  
224 Graham, supra note 169. E.g., Matt Pressberg, DOJ to Review Consent Decrees 
Barring Studios From Owning Movie Theaters, THE INFORMATION (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://www.theinformation.com/briefings/d99992. 
225 In 2015, Amazon announced it would begin producing movies for theatrical 
release. Chris Welch, Amazon announces plans to make movies for theaters, Prime 
streaming, THE VERGE (Jan. 19, 2015, 9:18 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2015/1/19/7852513/amazon-studios-making-movies-
for-theaters-prime-streaming. Netflix also released their first original film in 2015. 
Ingraham, supra note 183, and accompanying text. 
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Both Netflix226 and Amazon227 have shown an interest in obtaining 
theatrical releases for their original films.228 One obstacle standing in 
their path has been theater chains’ insistence on having a theatrical 
window before the films are released on Netflix’s and Amazon’s 
streaming platforms.229 Major theater chains refuse to exhibit films if 
the producer does not honor the theatrical window.230 Amazon and 
Netflix are looking at purchasing theaters to gain the ability to show 
films in theaters and on their streaming platforms on a “day-and-date” 
 
226 Netflix was rumored to be negotiating an acquisition of Landmark Theaters. 
Lizzie Plaugic, Netflix has reportedly considered buying theaters to screen its 
movies, THE VERGE (Apr. 19, 2018 4:37 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/19/17258114/netflix-theaters-landmark-mark-
cuban-buying-screenings-oscars-cannes [https://perma.cc/3DTQ-F78S]. Although 
the deal fell through, the negotiations signaled the company’s interest in potentially 
owning a theater chain. Id. 
227 Shortly after the rumors of Netflix’s interest, news broke that Amazon was also 
looking at a potential deal for Landmark Theaters. Spencer Soper, Anaousha 
Sakoui & Nabila Ahmed, Amazon reportedly in the running to acquire Landmark 
movie chain, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 16, 5:29 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon-reportedly-in-the-running-to-
acquire-landmark-movie-chain/ [https://perma.cc/692V-VHHB].  
228 See Graham, supra note 224. “‘This is probably a move to get broader 
distribution of [Amazon’s] film content,’ said Leo Kulp, an analyst with RBC 
Capital Markets. ‘Netflix had been discussed as a potential buyer of Landmark for 
a similar reason.’” Soper, supra note 227. Landmark currently has 50 theaters in 27 
markets, “including high-profile locations in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, 
Los Angeles, and San Francisco.” Id.  
229 See Jim Amos, Amazon Reportedly Has Interest In Landmark Theatres, But 
Why Would It?, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2018, 2:01 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamos/2018/08/16/why-landmark-would-be-a-head-
scratching-fit-for-amazon/#1870e9c965c7 [https://perma.cc/SN6J-U3Q5]. Netflix 
has thus far remained steadfast in refusing a theatrical release window. See 
Fennessey, supra note 175 (“Netflix goes direct to its service, with virtually no 
theatrical window.”). However, the company has signaled a softening of this 
stance, with three upcoming films set to be released in theaters with a window 
before the films hit Netflix’s streaming platform. Pamela McClintock, Netflix to 
Give 3 Award Contenders Exclusive Runs in Select Theaters, THE HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER (Oct. 31, 2018, 4:30 PM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/netflix-give-3-award-contenders-runs-
select-theaters-1153081 [https://perma.cc/RQ8R-HL8K]. On the other hand, 
Amazon has (for the moment) largely ceded to theater chains’ demand of a 
traditional window. FRITZ, supra note 101, at 196. Amazon found that theatrical 
windows actually have helped their business, stating “[C]ustomers wanted the 
awareness of the theatrical release to guide them on what to watch.” Id. The two 
companies’ strategies stand in stark contrast: “Amazon applies lessons learned 
from working within the Hollywood studio experience; Netflix defies them at will.” 
Fennessey, supra note 175. 
230 Amos, supra note 229.  
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basis (releasing a film in theaters and on the company’s platform on 
the same day).231 If the Decrees are eliminated (thus removing the 
scrutiny of production studios owning theaters), Amazon and Netflix 
would have an easier route to purchase their own theater chains (an 
idea both companies have already begun exploring).232 Once these tech 
companies own their own theaters, they can dictate their theatrical 
windows as they wish, removing a major barrier that has largely kept 
Silicon Valley away from Hollywood’s box office.233 
The threat from the studios’ new competition would not stop there. 
Amazon has a substantial track record of success once it enters an 
industry234; it would be unlikely that the box office would be any 
different. Amazon has already been buying smaller films neglected by 
the major studios, as well as producing their own films.235 However, 
Amazon’s business model is different from the typical movie studio. 
Rather than use movies as sources of revenue themselves236 (or to 
generate income from licensing), Amazon uses its film library as a way 
to incentivize Amazon Prime subscriptions (and thus increasing the 
 
231 Id.  
232 See supra notes 226-227.  
233 See supra notes 225-231 and accompanying text. Amazon has had only nine 
theatrical releases (six original productions, as well as Chi-Raq, Manchester By the 
Sea and The Big Sick each of which Amazon purchased the rights to after 
production). Amazon Studios, BOX OFFICE MOJO (last visited Dec. 5, 2018, 2:15 
PM), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/studio/chart/?yr=2018&view=company&studio=a
mazon.htm [https://perma.cc/49HW-NM8Z]. As of November 5, 2018, the six 
original productions had grossed a cumulative $9.8 million domestically, while the 
three purchased films grossed $93.2 million. Amazon Studios, supra note 233; Chi-
Raq, BOX OFFICE MOJO (last visited Nov. 5, 2018, 2:15 PM), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=chiraq.htm; Manchester By the Sea, 
BOX OFFICE MOJO (last visited November 5, 2018, 2:15 PM), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=manchesterbythesea.htm; The Big 
Sick, BOX OFFICE MOJO (last visited Nov. 5, 2018, 2:15 PM), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=thebigsick.htm.  
234 See Shira Ovide, How Amazon’s Bottomless Appetite Became Corporate 
America’s Nightmare, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-amazon-industry-displacement/; Jacob 
Sonenshine,  
Amazon is notorious for disrupting industries — now it’s eyeing entire countries 
(AMZN), BUSINESS INSIDER: MARKETS INSIDER (May 29, 2018, 4:03 PM), 
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/amazon-stock-price-notorious-
disrupting-industries-now-eyeing-entire-countries-2018-5-1025753496.  
235 FRITZ, supra note 101, at 187-200. 
236 “Amazon didn’t make movies primarily to make money from movies. It used 
movies to draw attention, to increase engagement, and to dominate people’s time 
and digital behavior so they would ultimately buy more stuff from the company.” 
Id. at 200. 
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number of consumers purchasing items on the platform).237 Because 
the financial success of Amazon’s production studio is not tied to the 
actual movies it creates, the company is less worried about the returns 
on each individual movie, instead focusing on how their content library 
impacts the company’s larger Prime subscriber base.238 Amazon’s 
ability to tolerate a movie’s financial loss already gives it an advantage 
over the major studios, who are dependent on their blockbusters to turn 
a profit.239 Should the Paramount Decrees be eliminated, Amazon 
would have the freedom to fully vertically-integrate its motion picture 
business, controlling production, distribution, and exhibition. 
Amazon’s strategy in the film industry appears to be similar to the one 
it utilized in dominating the book market.240 Allowing Amazon to flex 
its muscles in such a way would only serve to maximize its competitive 
advantage over already-vulnerable studios, who to this point haven’t 
seen direct competition at the box office from streaming services.241  
 
237 “The e-commerce company already spends billions each year on movies and TV 
shows, saying it helps entice shoppers to join its Prime subscription plan and makes 
existing members more likely to renew.” Soper, supra note 227. Amazon Studio’s 
focus has been on “art-house” movies aimed at higher-income, well-educated 
online shoppers. “If the ultimate goal of Amazon’s movie business was to attract, 
retain, and engage Prime subscribers, it only made sense to draw people who would 
buy the most computers, books, and Kindles online.” FRITZ, supra note 101, at 197. 
238 Id. at 199. 
239 Supra notes 122-145 and accompanying text. 
240 “In that instance, the corporation leveraged its leading position in online sales to 
build a dominant position in book sales; Amazon sells more than half of all 
physical books and 90 percent of e-books in the U.S. That, in turn, gave Amazon 
the ability to largely dictate terms to publishers, which rely on the corporation to 
get to market. It also allowed Amazon to integrate into publishing (both its own 
imprints and so-called ‘self-published’ books of independent authors). And it 
allowed Amazon to integrate into physical retail, with a rapidly growing list of 
outlets across America, including many in former locations of Barnes & Nobles 
and Borders.” Open Markets, The Corner Newsletter, August 23, 2018: Why the 
Paramount Consent Decrees Matter —Tech Giants Threaten Banking — An 
Overlooked Dissent at the FTC, OPEN MARKETS INSTITUTE (Aug. 24, 2018), 
https://openmarketsinstitute.org/newsletters/corner-newsletter-august-23-2018-
paramount-consent-decrees-matter-tech-giants-threaten-banking-overlooked-
dissent-ftc/.  
241 It has been suggested that Amazon as a fully-integrated movie studio could seize 
on several untapped advantages. For starters, Amazon jumping into Hollywood 
with both feet would allow it to build and maintain strong relationships with 
filmmakers. Additionally, it’s not difficult to imagine Amazon turning moviegoing 
into a more immersive experience, incorporating other perks of Prime membership 
into its theaters. David Bloom, Five Reasons Amazon Might Want to Buy 
Landmark Theaters, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2018, 2:15 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dbloom/2018/08/16/amazon-landmark-theaters-mark-
cuban-movies/#43ea6d125617.  
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Critics of Amazon worry that its domination of the book industry could 
be easily replicated in the film industry.242 
 
V. ARE CHANGES TO THE ANTITRUST ENVIRONMENT EVEN NEEDED? 
 
While many in the industry are debating the benefits and 
drawbacks that would come from removing the Paramount Decrees, a 
larger question should be answered first: are the studios even in trouble 
in the first place? A look at some recent developments show signs for 
optimism. 
Hollywood just saw its best month of October ever, grossing a 
record $820 million at the domestic box office (out-earning October 
2017 by 47%).243 This comes after new box office records were 
already set in 2018 for February,244 April,245 and June246 (four monthly 
records were also broken in 2017, one of them being October).247 The 
three highest-grossing years were 2016, 2015, and 2017, with 2018 
entering the top ten highest grossing years regardless of how 
Hollywood performs at the box office in November and December.248 
That’s not the only sign of progress: theater revenues are up 10% 
and attendance has increased by 7.7% year-over-year.249 Overall, 2018 
is on pace to sell the most theater tickets and have the highest inflation-
 
242 Open Markets, supra note 240. 
243 Brad Brevet, October Delivered a Record $820 Million at the Domestic Box 
Office, BOX OFFICE MOJO (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/news/?id=4454&p=.htm.  
244 Monthly Box Office (Wide Releases): February, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/monthly/?view=widedate&chart=bymonth&mont
h=2&sort=sumgross&order=DESC&p=.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2018 9:54 PM).  
245 Monthly Box Office (Wide Releases): April, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/monthly/?view=widedate&chart=bymonth&mont
h=4&sort=sumgross&order=DESC&p=.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2018 9:54 PM).  
246 Monthly Box Office (Wide Releases): June, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/monthly/?view=widedate&chart=bymonth&mont
h=6&sort=sumgross&order=DESC&p=.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2018 9:54 PM).  
247 Scott Mendelson, Hollywood Broke Monthly U.S. Box Office Records Four 
Times In 2017, FORBES (Jan. 12, 2018, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottmendelson/2018/01/12/hollywood-broke-
monthly-u-s-box-office-records-four-times-in-2017/#45cafdbc64a7.  
248 Yearly Box Office (Domestic), BOX OFFICE MOJO (last visited Nov. 7, 2018 9:54 
PM), 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/?sort=totalgross&order=DESC&p=.htm.  
249 Rebecca Rubin, Comeback Kid: Movie Theaters Rebound With a Vengeance, 
VARIETY (Nov. 7, 2018, 9:45 AM), https://variety.com/2018/biz/news/holiday-box-
office-2018-1203020373/.  
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adjusted box office since 2012.250 Even without a Star Wars or Marvel 
Cinematic Universe movie to bolster the end of the year, “industry 
analysts remain optimistic that the year will reach record territory even 
if the fourth quarter does fall flat.”251 
Additionally, studios have begun finding new opportunities 
abroad, most notably in China.252 China has become not only an 
enormous source of box office revenue, but also a place where studios 
can find investors willing to finance their films.253 
Even though tech companies have proven to be threats to the 
studios so far, it’s possible Hollywood finds a way to turn them into 
assets. One intriguing option presented itself to the studios--ironically 
in the form of a Silicon Valley start-up. Screening Room, backed by 
former Facebook president Sean Parker, was a proposed plan to give 
consumers in-home access to movies as they release to theaters.254 The 
plan would have charged $50 per view, and given consumers 48 hours 
to watch a given film.255 To assuage theater chains, Screening Room 
was to include two free tickets to see the movie in theaters, as well as 
entitling exhibitors to $20 of the $50 per-view fee.256 Studios would 
have also received a percentage of the fee.257 Ultimately, the idea was 
nixed, but it is not hard to fathom a similar idea cropping up in the near 
future.258 Warner Bros. and Fox were rumored to be working on their 
 
250 Domestic Movie Theatrical Market Summary 1995 to 2018, THE NUMBERS (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2018, 9:45 PM), https://www.the-numbers.com/market (based on 
annualized rates for 2018). 
251 Rubin, supra note 249.  
252 See FRITZ, supra note 101, at 201-219. 
253 Id. 
254 Brett Lang, Studios, Exhibitors Consider Revolutionary Plan for Day-and-Date 
Movies at Home, VARIETY (Mar. 9, 2016, 3:41 PM), 
https://variety.com/2016/film/news/studios-exhibitors-consider-revolutionary-plan-
for-day-and-date-movies-at-home-exclusive-1201725168. Screening Room would 
have offered movies in-home on their theatrical release dates, protected by anti-
piracy technology. Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Annlee Ellingson, New movies will play at home, just not via Screening Room, 
L.A. BIZ (May 31, 2017, 5:50 PM), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/losangeles/news/2017/05/31/new-movies-will-not-
play-via-screen-room.html.  
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own versions of a “day and date” model,259 while many other believe 
Apple’s iTunes would provide a natural fit for such an idea.260 
While day-and-date services are still just a concept, Hollywood has 
nevertheless found ways to utilize Silicon Valley as a tool. Paramount 
recently announced a multi-film agreement with Netflix.261 The studio 
will likely use the agreement to make mid-budget movies that no 
longer justify full theatrical releases.262 
Major studios are also beginning to adopt Amazon and Netflix’s 
own business models, with Disney and Warner Bros. both developing 
streaming services for their own content.263 Disney has already 
indicated that their streaming service, Disney+, will be the exclusive 
platform for their content, thus giving them a key competitive 
advantage over Netflix and Amazon: if viewers want to watch Disney 
movies, they have to pay for Disney+.264 Even if a studio chooses to 
license their films to other streaming companies, having their own 
streaming platform would give them leverage to negotiate a higher 
licensing fee. In this way, Silicon Valley isn’t threatening Hollywood 
as much as it is giving the studios a way to adapt to the new 
entertainment landscape.265 
 
259 The models being developed by Warner Bros. and Fox would make films 
available 30 days after their release dates (as compared to the standard 90-day 
theatrical window), and would charge $30 per viewing. Id. E.g., Jason Guerrasio, 
supra note 223.  
260 If studios and theaters allow a day-and-date model to launch, “they most likely 
would out their trust in a service they already work with, like iTunes.” Id.  
261 Rebecca Keegan, “A New Paradigm”: How Netflix and Apple Are Upending 
Hollywood Hierarchy With Studio Deals, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Nov. 27, 
2018, 6:35 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/apple-netflix-
reshaping-studio-hierarchy-paramount-a24-deals-1163992. Renowned independent 
studio A24 signed a similar deal with Apple. Id. 
262 Id. 
263 Gartenberg, supra note 214; William Hughes, Warner announces new three-
tiered streaming service, because online media wasn’t complicated enough, 
AV/NEWS (Nov. 29, 2018, 5:32 PM), https://news.avclub.com/warner-announces-
new-three-tiered-streaming-service-be-1830755192.  
264 Natalie Jarvey, Disney’s Top Dealmaker Kevin Mayer Talks Fox Plans and that 
New Streaming Service, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Dec. 18, 2018, 6:15 AM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/kevin-mayer-disneys-fox-acquisition-
new-streaming-service-1169862; Samit Sarkar, What Disney’s streaming service 
means for Netflix subscribers, POLYGON (Feb. 7, 2018, 4:15 PM), 
https://www.polygon.com/2018/2/7/16982030/disney-leaving-netflix-marvel-
lucasfilm-pixar-streaming-rights.  
265 In fact, The Hollywood Reporter’s predictions for Hollywood in 2019 include 
Disney’s dual-threat of Hulu and Disney+ slowing the growth of Netflix’s 
subscriber base. THR Staff, Hollywood Predictions 2019: Wheeling, Dealing and 
(for Some) Reeling, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 7, 2019, 6:55 AM), 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Hollywood currently finds itself in a precarious position, facing 
competition from Silicon Valley that is unlike anything it has seen 
before. In light of this competition, it’s understandable why one would 
think drastic measures need to be taken. In the heat of the moment, 
freeing the studios from the Paramount Decrees’ requirements may 
seem like a wise decision. The move would give studios more control 
over the industry, and leveraging this control could tilt the economics 
of moviemaking back in their favor. However, this move could be akin 
to the babysitter in a scary movie running up the stairs to get away 
from the monster. While removal of the Decrees could yield some 
benefits, it would also allow the likes of Netflix and Amazon to enter 
the industry flexing their fully-integrated muscles, ensuring the 
studios’ demise. 
Moreover, there are trends within the industry that indicate the 
threat has been overstated. Studios are finding new ways to generate 
revenue, and are even exploring utilizing in-home technology to their 
own benefit. In all, it would be prudent to leave the Paramount Decrees 
in place, and let the studios live to fight another day. 
 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/predictions-what-headlines-hollywood-
will-talking-year-1172764.  
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